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ARTICLES 
STAYING PUBLIC: INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS1
Much has been made lately of U.S. companies going private—
ownership of their equity (and sometimes debt) passing from public to 
private capital markets. In both the popular financial press and the academic 
literature, the focus has been on the cost-benefit analysis for companies that 
shun the regulated public securities in favor of the less regulated private 
securities markets.
 
Alan R. Palmiter* 
Abstract 
This essay questions the ascendance of U.S. private capital markets. 
Data on capital formation over the past decade (before the Panic of 2008) 
cast doubt on the story of capital users increasing their relative reliance 
on private capital. Further, the investment rules (and cultures) under 
which institutional investors operate suggest that private capital has only 
a limited pool from which to draw. Institutional investors, which 
collectively hold more than three-fourths of U.S. capital market 
investments, have not moved significantly from public trading markets to 
private trading markets. Rather than “going private,” they have “stayed 
public.” 
This study assembles data (apparently for the first time) on the 
investment practices of the major categories of institutional investors in 
the United States. It finds that institutional allocation between public and 
private capital has been relatively stable over the past decade. While the 
proportion of private investments has risen slightly for some U.S. 
institutional investors (private and public pension plans, endowment 
funds), it has fallen slightly for others (mutual funds, insurance 
companies). Institutional reticence toward private capital derives from the 
various investment restrictions on institutional investors and an 
institutional culture that focuses on “comparative”, not “absolute” 
returns. 
2
                                                                                                                           
*  Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. I thank Allen Mauldin (JD ‘10) for his 
invaluable help on this essay. He researched the portfolio allocation rules and practices of 
institutional investors in the United States, a task made more interesting and challenging by the 
almost complete absence of any law review or business articles on the topic. In fact, this would 
seem to be ground-breaking work—at least in the academy—and Allen was the one who first 
tilled the soil. 
 1. This essay was originally prepared for the Journal’s symposium, The “Going Private” of 
U.S. Capital Markets. 
 Specifically, the debate has turned mostly on whether 
 2. See David Wessel, Closing the Door: Going Private Offers Rewards, WALL ST. J., May 
17, 2007, at A2; Robert Bartlett, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088830. 
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the going-private phenomenon, viewed by many as inexorable, is driven by 
companies seeking to avoid public market costs (particularly the regulation 
introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) or to find private market 
benefits. 
Missing from the debate, focused as it is on the demand side of the U.S. 
capital markets, has been attention to the supply side. The prevailing 
assumption has been that capital suppliers will adjust the mix of public and 
private capital as needed to meet the demand of capital users.  That is, 
capital will flow to its most efficient use and will move from public to 
private markets (and from retail regulation to wholesale regulation) to meet 
the regulatory and other calculus of companies seeking capital. Only 
individual retail investors, a dwindling class in the throes of 
“deretailization,” will be stuck in the public markets. 
But the assumption that institutional investors—which constitute more 
than three-fourths of both the U.S. public equity markets and U.S. public 
debt markets3
                                                                                                                           
 3. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 89, 90, 
Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20080918/. 
—can move their portfolios from publicly-traded securities to 
privately-traded securities is largely untested. The various institutional 
investors in the United States, each subject to their own panoply of 
regulatory restrictions and financial cultures, face a number of constraints in 
shifting from the public to the private capital markets. Indeed, institutional 
capital may be locked into the public markets far more than the going-
private debate recognizes. 
In this essay, I question the story that the going-private phenomenon 
threatens to unravel retail markets and thus retail regulation. The data, even 
on casual observation, suggests otherwise. With the institutionalization of 
the U.S. capital markets, all indications over the past couple decades are 
that the U.S. public capital markets retain their dominance: stock listings 
and capital formation in public markets remain robust, the proportion of 
public market financing remains constant (if not slightly higher than private 
market financing), and retail investors still constitute a sizeable proportion 
of the U.S. equity markets. 
The staying power of public capital markets is not surprising given their 
(oft-repeated) advantages and attendant regulation. Public securities 
markets in the United States are open to all—including to individual retail 
investors, all stripes of institutional investors, and even foreign investors 
(private and governmental). All benefit from public market liquidity, 
transparency, and accountability—each a public good not fully available in 
private markets. Companies that engage in regulatory arbitrage by moving 
to private markets for their financing needs must overcome these public 
market advantages. 
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Beyond the financial advantages of public market investment, many 
institutional investors are “captive” to public securities markets. For some, 
the regulatory regime under which they operate compels that they 
concentrate their portfolios in publicly-traded securities. For example, 
registered mutual funds must price their portfolio securities on a daily basis; 
they may not hold more than 10% of any one company’s equity securities; 
and open-end funds must be prepared to redeem their shares on demand.4
Note on timeframe of data: Most of the data used in this essay come 
from before 2008, thus missing the wrenching changes in financial markets 
wrought by the Panic of 2008. But the basic conclusions that I reach—
namely, that over the past several years public capital markets have 
 
These regulatory requirements effectively compel mutual funds to hold 
diversified portfolios of publicly-traded securities—which they do. 
For other institutional investors, an investment culture (as opposed to a 
set of regulatory mandates) has come to presuppose public market 
investments. For example, private pension funds, subject to a prudent 
investor standard under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), continue to place the bulk of their investments in public securities 
markets. Given the absence of mandated disclosure, price transparency and 
ready liquidity in private markets, managers of private pension funds find it 
easier to follow the crowd. Even if diversification into private markets may 
offer better long-term returns, the strategy of “blazing new investment 
trails” would raise questions about the manager’s prudence. 
For some institutional investors, a combination of portfolio allocation 
rules and a conservative investment culture leads to portfolios that are 
dominated by public market investments. For example, public pension 
funds and insurance companies—both subject primarily to state portfolio 
regulation—are often compelled to have certain percentages of their 
portfolios (both equity and debt) in publicly-traded securities and to limit 
their investment in illiquid private investments. In addition, both answer to 
oversight bodies for which peer comparability (relative returns) may be 
more important than investment maximization (absolute returns). 
Not surprisingly, those institutional investors that are least regulated 
(foreign sovereign wealth funds) and those that are more willing to embrace 
investment experimentation (endowment funds) have shown a willingness 
to increase their allocation to private securities markets. But even then, the 
investment levels reflect not an exodus, but rather a shift in emphasis. Even 
for institutional investors with the legal and cultural flexibility to leave 
public markets, the allure of the protections inherent in public market 
investment has been notable. Private markets may have carved a niche, but 
have not created a movement. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 4. 26 U.S.C. § 851 (2009). 
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maintained their comparative advantage over private capital markets and 
that institutional investors are committed by law and custom to public 
capital markets—are only reinforced by the recent capital market turmoil. 
In fact, my main thesis that U.S. institutional capital shows a marked 
preference for public capital markets seems to have been tested (and 
proved) by the Panic of 2008. 
During the current Panic, many investors (individual and institutional) 
have sought to abandon the private capital markets. Among the reasons has 
been the lack of transparency and liquidity, along with the perception that 
private capital markets have done no better, and perhaps worse, than the 
public capital markets in anticipating the effects of non-performing 
subprime mortgage investments on the U.S. and global financial systems. 
The Madoff scandal5
I. “GOING PRIVATE”—THE DEMAND SIDE 
 has only reinforced the growing realization that 
private investments may be (sorely) under-regulated, their benefits 
outweighed by their costs. In the end, this essay confirms an emerging 
consensus that the public capital markets offer advantages that the private 
capital markets cannot duplicate. The old-fashioned investment allocation 
rules under which many institutional investors have long operated may 
reflect a time-worn wisdom. 
* * * 
I begin this essay in Part I with a look at the “going private” 
phenomenon, summarizing the extent of and the reasons for U.S. companies 
turning to the private capital markets—that is, the demand side of the 
market. Next, Part II turns to an overview of the U.S. capital markets, 
considering the ongoing deretailization of the public equity markets, the 
flows of new capital into the U.S. public equity markets, and the trends in 
the allocation between public and private financing. Finally, Part III looks 
at the supply side of the institutional capital markets in the United States, 
considering the portfolio allocation rules and practices (and investment 
cultures) of the various institutional investor categories—with a particular 
focus on the public/private investment mix for each. 
Before exploring the staying power of the U.S. public securities 
markets—both generally and for institutional investors—it is useful to 
consider the siren call of the “going-private” phenomenon. For those who 
have looked at the phenomenon, mostly in only the last couple years, views 
differ on its scope and future. Although there is data pointing to a surge in 
companies turning (wholly or partially) to private capital markets, the 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See Tom Lauricella, Aaron Lucchetti & Amir Efrati, Madoff Ran Vast Options Game, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, at A1; see also Brett Arends, Madoff An Unwitting Poster Boy for 
Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122946065748411579.html (describing how the Madoff scandal has reinforced superiority and 
safety of public mutual funds for investors). 
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phenomenon showed signs as early as 2006 of having reached an apex.6 
That is, even as some have argued that conditions in the public capital 
markets (particularly the compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley) have led many 
U.S. companies to engage in regulatory arbitrage by shifting to private 
capital markets, the more considered evidence is that private capital 
constitutes an important niche, but does not constitute a tidal shift in U.S. 
corporate capitalism.7
“Going private” has come in three flavors: (1) public companies that 
remove their publicly-traded securities from the public markets and thus 
avoid further public company reporting and regulation; (2) public 
companies that satisfy new capital needs on private markets, but remain 
subject to public company reporting (and sometimes regulation); and (3) 
private companies that remain private, relying on private financing for their 
capital needs.
 
8
Over the past ten years, both private equity (funding of operating 
companies with non-public equity) and venture capital (funding of start-up 
companies with non-public equity) have been extremely volatile as funding 
sources. Between 1998 and 2005, the compound growth rate for private 
equity investment in North America was only 2.6%, peaking in 2000 at 
$128 billion and reaching its lowest point in 2002 at $42.5 billion.
 
9 
Similarly, venture capital investment has swung from a high in 2000 of over 
$100 billion, to a modest upward trend from about $20 billion in 2003 to 
$30 billion in 2007—an annual growth rate of about 6.9%.10
                                                                                                                           
 6. See Emily Thornton, Going Private, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_09/b3973001.htm. 
 7. See generally Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity (ECGI, Law 
Working Paper Series No. 82, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114. 
 8. A public company can avoid Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration and 
reporting requirements in a couple ways. First, it can de-register (known as “going dark”) when 
the number of record shareholders falls below 300 (or sometimes 500)—typically accomplished 
through a stock split or stock buyback/tender offer. A public company that “goes dark” does not 
change its ownership structure, but exposes itself to shareholder fiduciary claims for the illiquidity 
and non-transparency resulting from de-registration. Second, and far more common, the public 
company can “go private” by replacing public investors with private investors—accomplished 
typically through a squeeze-out merger or buyback/tender offer followed by a back-end merger. A 
public company that “goes private” must structure the transaction to be fair to existing 
shareholders and then must answer to a new group of outside investors, often including debt 
investors. See Michael J. McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions: A 
Practitioner’s Guide, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2005) (discussing legal standards applicable to a 
going-private transaction, including the business judgment rule, fairness doctrine and judicial 
review); see generally FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP, DISCUSSION AT THE NATIONAL DIRECTORS 
INSTITUTE: GOING PRIVATE / GOING DARK TRANSACTIONS, Mar. 10, 2005, available at 
www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2691/NDI_ GoingPrivate_FINAL.pdf. 
 9. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PRIVATE EQUITY GOING PUBLIC: GLOBAL PRIVATE 
EQUITY REPORT 2006, at 12 (2007), available at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/ 
moneytree/filesource/exhibits/Global_PE_ 2006.pdf [hereinafter PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS]. 
 10. A 2008 PricewaterhouseCoopers report shows new investment in venture capital firms (in 
billions of dollars) for the past ten years: 
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Although private equity and venture capital dominated business 
conversations during the early 2000s, industry observers noted the “glass 
ceiling” both seemed to face. A 2007 report on private equity by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers began by pointing out the growing trend of private 
equity firms seeking access to public market equity.11
A. REASONS FOR COMPANIES TO GO PRIVATE 
 
The prevailing justifications for companies to go private are to avoid 
the heavy compliance costs of being public (particularly after Sarbanes-
Oxley) and to avoid the myopic and shifting expectations of public 
markets.12 Once private, companies can raise capital less expensively, 
without the regulatory burden and competitive side effects of public 
disclosure, and can focus their business plans on the long-term, without the 
short-term financial demands of the financial media and public investors.13
Compliance costs (that private firms avoid) arise from the retail 
regulation that applies to raising capital (mostly under the Securities Act of 
1933) and to ongoing status as a public company (mostly under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002). For a typical $100 million initial public offering, out-of-pocket 
expenses run at about $3 million, and the usual underwriting spread (7%) 
reduces the offering proceeds by another $7 million.
 
The protections for investors in public companies are replicated for 
investors in private companies through ex ante contractual disclosure and 
participation rights, as well as the ex post antifraud rules of the federal 
securities laws. 
14 Add to this the 
present value of ongoing disclosure requirements, as well as the auditing 
and internal control costs borne by public companies, less the reduced costs 
of subsequent offerings, and going public becomes quite costly.15
                                                                                                                           
1998 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (Q1/Q2) 
21.1 54.1 105.0 40.6 22.0 19.8 22.4 23.1 26.7 30.7 14.9 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS AND NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, MONEYTREE 
REPORT: TOTAL U.S. INVESTMENTS BY YEAR Q1 1998 – Q2 2008 (2008), available at 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/exhibits/MoneyTree%20-
%20Q2%202008%20final.pdf (showing total investments in venture-backed companies). 
 11. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 9, at 5 (asserting that the potential desire to 
access public markets by private equity is a driver of the trend to better conform with the norms of 
public markets). 
 12. See Thornton, supra note 6 (discussing that companies chose to go public to avoid both the 
costs of regulation and gain the ability to concentrate on the long term repairing of the company). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 1 COL. BUS. L. REV. 172 (2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012042. 
 15. See id. 
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Private equity, it has been claimed, reaped large rewards in recent 
years.16 Ronald Masulis and Randall Thomas identify a major reason for 
this success to be the corporate governance advantages of private equity 
over the public corporation.17 They argue that the recent development of 
substantial derivative contracts and trading has significantly weakened the 
governance of public corporations, compelling a need for much closer 
supervision of management by financially sophisticated directors.18 The 
private equity model delivers these benefits and allows corporations to be 
better governed, creating wealth gains for investors.19
Dale Oesterle identifies the ability of companies financed by private 
equity to engage in longer-term, higher-risk, positive net value business 
strategies and to create financial incentives for managers without being 
subject to public disclosure and short-term market demands.
 
20 Private 
companies (often financed primarily through debt rather than equity) have a 
different management style, compared to public companies.21 Their boards 
are smaller and more knowledgeable, with uniform goals and more 
monitoring functions.22 Managers (who need not answer to public 
shareholders, analysts or the media) have more freedom to take risks, 
particularly given the board’s emphasis on long-term results.23 Management 
compensation is more performance-based, with less protection from 
failure.24
In addition, there are indications that companies that rely on private 
markets no longer suffer the heavy liquidity and non-transparency discounts 
that once characterized private markets. For example, some private markets, 
open to a wide array of institutional investors and wealthy individuals, have 
come to resemble public markets. In 2007, Goldman Sachs created an 
institutions-only trading market, GSTrue, which served as the platform for 
 
                                                                                                                           
 16. Whether private equity has produced better risk-adjusted returns than public equity has 
produced a lively debate. Cf. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity 
Create Wealth? (Vanderbilt Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1207858; William W. Bratton, Private 
Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2008). 
 17. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 16. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53 (2008). Not surprisingly, going-private transactions in the 
United States are more prevalent among established, solid-growth, low-leveraged public 
companies—a phenomenon also observed in the UK and Ireland. See Hadiye Aslan & Praveen 
Kumar, Going Public and Going Private: What Determines the Choice of Ownership Structure?, 
(June 12, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993170 (finding that “firms going private 
through private equity buyouts are larger, less levered, and have superior cash flows than firms 
that go private through other types of transactions.”). 
 21. Oesterle, supra note 20 at 53, 63–64. 
 22. Id. at 63. 
 23. Id. at 64. 
 24. Id. 
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an $828 million IPO.25 In cooperation with a number of securities firms, 
NASDAQ also has developed PORTAL, an institutions-only market for 
144A debt.26
A good deal of debate has swirled around the question of whether 
compliance costs under Sarbanes-Oxley have catalyzed the going-private 
movement in the United States.
 
27 Although the initial (mostly politically-
motivated) reactions were that Sarbanes-Oxley was driving companies from 
U.S. public markets, recent academic studies cast significant doubts on the 
story. Instead, the data suggest that larger public companies have actually 
benefited from the legislation—the various auditing and internal controls 
provide reassurance to investors.28 For smaller companies, however, 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs may have been a factor in their going-
private decisions. In the end, however, the worldwide private equity boom 
(including in countries where Sarbanes-Oxley does not apply) suggests that 
compliance costs have not been the dominant factor influencing the U.S. 
going-private phenomenon.29
Evidence of the relative unimportance of Sarbanes-Oxley to the going-
private decision, particularly for larger companies, comes from a number of 
quarters. Robert Bartlett, looking at 468 going-private transactions from 
1998–2006 (excluding 2002), found that larger public companies going 
private after the 2002 legislation continued to use high-yield public debt to 
finance their transactions, thus remaining subject to public registration and 
reporting requirements.
 
30
                                                                                                                           
 25. Apollo Raises $828 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at C6. 
 26. See Lynn Cowan, Banks to Share Platform for 144A Trades, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2007, 
at C3. 
 27. See Marc Morgenstern & Peter Nealis, Going Private: A Reasoned Response to Sarbanes-
Oxley? (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/pnealis.pdf (asserting the 
diminishing benefits of remaining public and the rewards of going private, and concluding that 
costs of going private or going dark keep many public companies from realizing the rewards of 
going private). 
 28. See Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion 
of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions (May 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=990016 (citing to a “growing body of evidence that SOX has increased 
the scrutiny on firms and has produced certain benefits.”). 
 29. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis 56–57 (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Law and 
Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 52, 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art52/. 
 30. Bartlett, supra note 2. In fact, Bartlett found that the rates of public registration actually 
increased for larger companies in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. In purchasing notes, a bidder is 
often required by the lender to subject itself to Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulation. Issuers of high-
yield notes are generally required to file periodic reports with the SEC as a result of an express 
obligation in an agreement. 
 That is, even as private capital became more 
available, many companies opted to continue their public reporting status. 
Likewise, many practitioners have commented that Sarbanes-Oxley played 
a minor role in large-company going-private transactions; many companies 
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turned to private equity as a means to restructure rather than avoid 
regulation.31
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley may have 
been a factor (though not the only factor) in pushing smaller companies out 
of public markets. Bill Carney has cited an increase in the number of 
companies going private after Sarbanes-Oxley, though he acknowledges 
that many of these going-private transactions may have been the result of 
declining stock prices.
 
32 That is, Sarbanes-Oxley may have simply 
identified those companies for which the net benefits of public status 
hovered near zero. And for those smaller companies that have not exited the 
public markets, the calculus may well have been that the benefits that led 
the companies to initially go public outweigh the compliance and other 
costs of Sarbanes-Oxley.33
B. EFFECT OF COMPANIES GOING PRIVATE 
 
The going-private phenomenon, i.e., the movement of companies from 
public capital to private capital, has had the effect of carving out an 
investment niche available only to non-retail investors.  It is widely 
assumed that the expansion of private markets has added to the growing 
institutionalization of the U.S. securities markets—and thus their 
concomitant “deretailization.”34 For example, Brian Cartwright (the SEC’s 
general counsel) has pointed to the general exclusion of retail investors 
from venture capital, private equity and hedge funds—which Cartwright 
has assumed provide higher diversified returns than other asset classes 
available to retail investors.35
In the end, it remains to be seen whether private capital provided by 
wealthy individuals and institutional investors protected only by private 
systems of disclosure and oversight can be as effective as their public 
counterparts. The early evidence is mixed. Although there has been a 
 
                                                                                                                           
 31. Symposium, Corporate Governance: The Ins and Outs for Ds and Os: Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Was It Worth It?, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. 643, 664 (2007). 
 32. William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of ‘Going 
Private’, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 151, 158 (2006). There is general agreement that Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
compliance burdens fell more heavily on smaller public companies. See Joseph A. Castelluccio 
III, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404 and the Case for a Small Business 
Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2005) (proposing a small-company exemption to section 404 
of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 33. See Andrew Skouvakis, Comment, Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult Choice for 
Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1279, 1291 
(2005) (pointing out that Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs decline over time, with 
implementation costs disappearing once required internal control systems are in place). 
 34. See Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities 
Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/ 
spch102407bgc.htm) (coining the phrase “deretailization” to describe the decreasing proportion 
of, and investment opportunities for, individual retail investors in the public equities markets). 
 35. Id. 
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widespread view that private equity outperforms public equity—given the 
lower compliance costs and higher net value business models for private 
companies—more recent evidence suggests that private equity may not be 
scaleable.36
C. GOING-PRIVATE PHENOMENON IN CONTEXT 
 
There are reasons to doubt the broad future of private equity. Private 
companies suffer from two levels of opacity. First, private companies are 
subject to more limited observation. Rather than the many observers in a 
public company (shareholders, independent directors, regulators, media), 
private companies, for the most part, have only their capital providers (and 
perhaps independent directors) to watch over them. Second, the opacity 
within private companies is compounded by the opacity within institutional 
investors themselves. Without intermediating public markets, institutional 
investors may not be optimal owners. Many cannot sit on the board of 
portfolio companies, most do not disclose their voting, none have 
enforceable fiduciary duties as shareholders, and there exists no 
institutional ethos of oversight. 
The going-private phenomenon of the past decade should be kept in 
context. It is not the first time that U.S. capital users have turned to private 
capital—only to return to public capital after a short dalliance. The depth 
and liquidity of the public capital markets, despite their regulatory costs and 
homogenizing tendencies, have proven more attractive and permanent. In 
short, public capital may well be the worst form of capitalism, except for all 
the others. 
Escape from public markets is a regular and cyclical phenomenon. In 
the 1940s, corporate America turned to the government and its cost-plus 
contracts for capital during the war effort. In the 1960s, many companies 
shunned the public capital markets and opted for private capital from 
conglomerate structures. In the 1980s, many companies (whether or not 
subject to a takeover bid) turned to private debt markets to buy out public 
equity owners and finance their streamlined businesses. 
That is, movements away from public capital have not had staying 
power—eventually they fall victim to their lack of depth and effective 
oversight.37 For example, Brian Cheffins and John Armour have concluded 
that private equity, despite its current momentum, is unlikely to ever 
displace the public stock market as the center of U.S. financial markets.38
                                                                                                                           
 36. See Wessel, supra note 2, at A2 (identifying as reasons for public companies to go private 
the avoidance of public securities regulation, the leveraging of the company to maximize equity 
returns, the ability to make tough restructuring decisions, and the attraction of better executives). 
 37. See id. (concluding that private equity is not permanent, citing the leveraged-buyout (LBO) 
boom of the 1980s that ended when targets became more expensive and credit became tighter). 
 38. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity 4 (ECGI, Law Working 
Paper Series No. 82, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114. 
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They emphasize the results of prior merger trends, including the dominance 
of conglomerates in the 1960s and the rise in leveraged buyouts of the 
1980s, noting that both eras ended with a return by investors to public 
markets.39 The authors predict that, given the trend beginning in 2006 of 
private equity firms turning to IPOs, public markets will play a significant 
role in the future of private equity.40
There are already signs that the recent going-private movement may be 
waning, with the private-public pendulum swinging back to public capital.
 
41 
Steven Davidoff, finding evidence of this in recent litigation trends, notes 
that, during the bear market that began in 2007, private equity firms 
repeatedly sought to terminate pending acquisitions.42 The litigation 
surrounding these terminations, Davidoff concludes, has exposed the failure 
of parties to specify fully their investment relationship and raises doubts 
about the optimality of private equity.43
II. U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS—INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND 
CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
Not only do these terminations suggest that private contracting may be 
less fulsome than the gap-filling provided by public corporate law, they also 
undermine the story that private equity has a longer-term investment 
horizon and greater valuation perspicacity than public equity. Instead, 
public equity, with its long-standing legal and market structures, as well as 
its transparency and mechanisms for self-correction, may be a more optimal 
investment method. 
So is this latest dalliance with private capital different? Ultimately, the 
answer depends on a combination of factors, such as whether private capital 
is indeed less expensive and whether the business structures it facilitates are 
more efficient than public capital. But even more important is whether 
private capital is as deep as public capital—a question that depends on 
whether U.S. capital (now mostly institutional) has the capability to switch 
from public markets to private markets. 
U.S. capital markets have not been static. Over the past half century, 
ownership of public equity has shifted dramatically from individuals to 
institutions—perhaps reflecting (at least in part) the greater monitoring and 
                                                                                                                           
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Predictions that this time the private equity phenomenon was here to stay may have been 
premature. See Thornton, supra note 6 (describing high-profile going-private transactions and 
private equity markets; concluding that companies financed by private equity will not revert to 
public companies). 
 42. Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148178 (identifying as a 
“flaw” that lawyers negotiating and drafting private equity contracts failed to appreciate the extra-
legal norms surrounding private equity financing). 
 43. Id. 
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governance efficacy of institutional shareholders, compared to their more 
dispersed and less effective individual counterparts.44
The mass migration from individual ownership to institutional 
ownership, however, has not been matched by a movement to private 
markets—where institutions presumably face fewer impediments (legal and 
financial) to invest.
 
45 Instead, public markets continue to garner the bulk of 
both equity and debt financing. Although twenty years ago some predicted 
an “eclipse of the public corporation,” the private financing of once-public 
corporations bought out in leveraged buyouts was short-lived.46
A. DERETAILIZATION OF EQUITY MARKETS 
 
The following charts capture the principal stories of capital movements 
in the United States over the past few decades. They tell a story, in its 
essence, that U.S. public capital markets have come to be dominated by 
institutional investors. They further tell the story that this 
institutionalization has not led to dramatic shifts away from public equity 
markets, despite the shifting concentrations in institutional ownership. 
Since 1945, the proportion of retail ownership of publicly-traded 
equities has declined steadily. In 1950, households owned more than 90% 
of publicly-traded U.S. equities; at the close of 2007, household ownership 
stood at just over 25%.47
                                                                                                                           
 44. See Cartwright, supra note 34. 
 45. See Morgenstern & Nealis, supra note 27. 
 46. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept–Oct. 1989 
(Revised 1997), at 1–4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149. 
 47. SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION [SIFMA], 2008 FACT 
BOOK, 71 (electronic version) (citing FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3) [hereinafter 2008 
FACT BOOK]. 
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Figure 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, while retail ownership of public equity (in dollar terms and 
as a proportion of GDP) declined markedly after the 2000s dot.com 
collapse, it stabilized over the ensuing years.49 In fact, retail ownership of 
public equity as a proportion of GDP (except for the dot.com bubble) has 
been relatively stable over the past three decades.50
                                                                                                                           
 48. Id. Data for 2002–2007 is taken directly from FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3. 
 49. Id. at 71; see also Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Product, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&FirstYear=2007&LastYe
ar=2008&Freq=Qtr (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (listing total value of U.S. gross domestic product 
by year). 
 50. 2008 FACT BOOK, supra note 47, at 71 (citing FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 
90); Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, supra note 49. 
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Figure 251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. CAPITAL FLOWS 
The data also reveals a (short term) return to stability in the public 
equity markets after the dot.com bubble, precisely during the period of the 
supposed ascendance of private equity. For example, the story of a 
withering public equity market during the early 2000s is not borne out by 
the number of listed companies on public stock exchanges. Although the 
number of public listings declined after the dot.com era, it stabilized 
afterward. As of 2007 there were about 7000 listed companies on the U.S. 
stock exchanges, about as many as there were prior to the 1994–2002 
dot.com bubble.52
                                                                                                                           
 51. Id. 
 52. See Figure 3, infra note 53. 
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Figure 353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even more telling was the solid and steady increase in the value of 
underwritings in public markets during the period from 2002 to 2007—
including both debt and equity. After a slowdown in the early 2000s, the 
public capital markets flourished in the next four years. In absolute terms, 
public underwritings increased from approximately $1.2 trillion per year in 
the late 1990s to over $3 trillion per year in 2007. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 53. 2008 FACT BOOK, supra note 47, at 48 (electronic version) (citing FEDERAL RESERVE 
BOARD, supra note 3). 
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Figure 454 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most telling of the continuing comparative advantage of U.S. public 
capital markets during the 2002–2007 period was the proportion of total 
U.S. offerings that were public, as compared to those that were private. In 
2006, the most recent year for which there are data, public offerings 
represented a higher proportion of total U.S. offerings than they had in any 
year since 1985. Although there was a clear move toward private financing 
in the late 1980s (during the LBO phenomenon), there was no such 
movement toward private placements in the 2000s. To the contrary, public 
underwritings increased steadily during the 2000s as a proportion of the 
overall U.S. capital markets. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 54. Id. at 10. 
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Figure 555 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stepping away from the anecdotal accounts of the “going private” of 
U.S. capital markets, the data suggest that the phenomenon is isolated and 
even temporary. The public markets, from all indications, are here to stay. 
Why is this? 
III. “STAYING PUBLIC”—THE SUPPLY SIDE 
For the going-private phenomenon to have legs, private capital users 
must be able to tap into private capital suppliers. The remarkable (and 
seemingly inexorable) decline of retail investors offers superficial support 
for the story (or, at least, possibility) of private capital’s ascendance.  As 
institutional investors have come to dominate the U.S. capital markets, the 
supply of private capital would seem nearly inexhaustible—limited only by 
the breadth and depth of private capital demand. 
The assumption that U.S. institutional investors have the freedom to 
allocate their portfolios between private and public investments, however, 
misconceives the specific regulatory and cultural restrictions under which 
each institutional category operates. For most institutional capital in the 
United States, the current reality is that private investment lives under a 
variety of de jure and de facto caps. 
A snapshot of the supply side of the U.S. public capital markets as of 
2007 provides some context. Institutional investors dominate both the U.S. 
publicly-traded equity and debt markets: 
 
                                                                                                                           
 55. Id. 
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Table 156
 
 
Proportion of Market Ownership by Institutional Investors 
 
Publicly-traded equities 
($21.5 trillion) 
Publicly-traded debt57
Mutual funds 
 
($10.7 trillion) 
28.9% 13.4% 
Public pension funds 10.0% 2.4% 
Private pension funds 12.9% 2.9% 
Life Insurance companies 8.0% 20.3% 
Financial Institutions 1.4% 14.8% 
Endowment funds58 -------  ------- 
Foreign Investment 13.0% 23.3% 
Retail (individuals) 25.4% 15.2% 
 
Figure 659 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past 25 years, the principal story in the institutional equity 
market has been the emergence (and now dominance) of mutual funds. The 
other story has been the relative decline of pension funds, as retirement 
savings has moved from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans,60
                                                                                                                           
 56. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 89–90. 
 57. Includes holdings of foreign debt by U.S. residents. See id. 
 58. The Federal Reserve Board does not list endowments separately in its Flow of Funds 
report. 
 59. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 90. 
 
 60. In a defined-benefit plan, retirement benefits are determined by a set formula, rather than 
depending on investment returns. A traditional pension plan that defines benefits owed by the 
employer to employees upon their retirement is a defined-benefit plan. In a defined-contribution 
plan, contributions are paid into an individual account for each member. The contributions are 
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which rely extensively on mutual funds. And finally there has been the 
remarkable arrival in the U.S. equity markets of foreign investors, 
particularly foreign sovereign wealth funds. 
The following sections describe the portfolio allocation requirements 
and strategies for the various categories of institutional investors in the 
United States. It is a broad-stroke picture, often generalized and thus 
simplistic, but useful in gauging the potential of the “privatization” of U.S. 
capital. By and large, the consistent story—with only a few exceptions—is 
that institutional investors are bound to the public capital markets either by 
law, by long-standing tradition, or both. 
A. MUTUAL FUNDS 
As of 2007, U.S. mutual funds managed $13 trillion dollars in assets,61 
with approximately $9 trillion in long-term equity and debt funds.62 Most 
mutual fund assets ($6.6 trillion) were held in equity funds and, of this, 
most ($5 trillion) in U.S. public equities.63 Mutual funds represented the 
largest category of institutional investors in the U.S. public equity market, 
holding almost 25% of total outstanding publicly-traded equities.64
Mutual funds have grown steadily over the past 25 years. In 1970, U.S. 
mutual funds held a total of $47 billion in assets.
 
65 By the end of 2007, they 
held nearly $12 trillion in assets, most (nearly 93%) in open-end mutual 
funds that, by law, are subject to redemption on demand.66 As retirement 
assets transition from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans, 
mutual fund growth is likely to continue given their widespread use in IRA 
and 401(k) plans.67
                                                                                                                           
then invested, and investment returns (positive or negative) are credited to the individual’s 
account. On retirement, the member’s account provides retirement benefits. 
 61. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE [ICI], 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, 9, fig. 
1.1. (2008), available at http://ici.org/stats/latest/2008_factbook.pdf [hereinafter INVESTMENT 
COMPANY FACTBOOK]. 
 62. Id. at 135 (approximately $3 trillion is held in short-term money market funds). There are 
8,029 registered mutual funds, of which 4,767 are equity funds, 1,967 bond funds, and 807 money 
market funds. 
 63. See id. at 9, fig. 1.1, Investment Company Assets; see also 2008 FACT BOOK, supra note 
47, at 71 (electronic version) (citing FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3). Individual assets 
in equity funds were twelve times larger than institutional assets. As of 2007, individuals held 
over $6 trillion in equity funds, while institutions had invested less than $500 billion. Institutional 
investment in mutual funds was highest in money market funds. 
 64. Equity mutual funds have increased the proportion of their holdings in common and 
preferred stock. In 1994, for example, 87.1% of the average equity fund portfolio was in invested 
stocks. In 2007, stock investment in such funds was 94.8%. See INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACTBOOK, supra note 61, at 136. 
 65. Id. at 110. 
 66. Id. at 9. 
 
 67. See PETER BRADY & SARAH HOLDEN, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, RESEARCH 
FUNDAMENTALS, THE U.S. RETIREMENT MARKET, 2007, at 1 (July 2008), available at 
http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/fm-v17n3.pdf. Defined-contribution and IRA assets, which now 
comprise more than half of the total retirement assets in the United States, are heavily invested in 
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1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
Mutual funds are subject to diversification rules under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), as well as the Internal Revenue Code. A 
registered mutual fund may not invest more than 5% of its assets in any one 
issuer (other than the U.S. government),68 nor may it hold more than 10% 
of the securities of any one issuer.69
The 1940 Act, however, imposes no explicit portfolio allocation 
requirements on mutual funds.
 
70 Nonetheless, the portfolio valuation 
requirements imposed by the 1940 Act and SEC rules implicitly compel 
mutual funds (especially open-end funds) to invest primarily in publicly-
traded securities. Open-end funds are required to calculate, at least daily, 
the net asset value of their holdings, typically after the close of the major 
U.S. exchanges.71 Assets with readily available price information are valued 
at current market value, and other assets at “fair value” as determined in 
good faith by the fund’s board of directors.72
These pricing rules have generally led mutual funds to invest only in 
publicly-traded liquid securities and to avoid illiquid assets such as venture 
capital, private equity, or restricted shares of public companies.
 
73 
Recognizing the difficulties of valuing illiquid securities,74 the SEC has 
recommended that funds limit investment in illiquid assets to no more than 
10% to 15% of fund assets.75 In practice, equity funds invest less than 1% 
in non-publicly-traded securities.76
                                                                                                                           
mutual funds. At the close of 2007, 47% of IRA assets were held in mutual funds, compared to 
38% held in securities brokerage accounts. See id. at 5. Similarly, mutual funds manage 54% of 
total assets in 401(k) and 403(b) retirement plans. See id. at 10. 
 68. 26 U.S.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2009). 
 69. 26 U.S.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
 70. SEC rules require only that at least 80% of a fund’s assets be invested in a manner 
suggested by the fund’s name. 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2008). 
 71. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2008). 
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a41-1 (2008) (defining “value” as (i) “market value” for securities for 
which market quotations are readily available, and (ii) for all others, “fair value as determined in 
good faith by the board of directors”); Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (requiring 
“current net asset value” to be computed at least daily, at such time fixed by the fund’s board of 
directors); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2008) (defining “current net asset value” for purposes of 
calculating value of redeemable fund shares). 
 73. Janet Smith, Richard Smith & Karyn Williams, The SEC’s “Fair Value” Standard for 
Mutual Fund Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 421 (2001). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 445 (describing Accounting Series Releases 113 and 118); see also TAMAR 
FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 353 (3d ed. 2005) 
(noting that in 1992, the SEC revised its guidelines to permit open-end funds to invest up to 15% 
of assets in illiquid securities). 
 76. Smith, Smith & Williams, supra note 73, at 446. By paying a premium for liquidity, it has 
been argued (without empirical support) that mutual funds do not attain the returns or the 
diversification that other investment funds do. Id. at 423–24. Whether mutual funds will invest in 
less liquid assets, given the current market slowdown, is unknown. See id. at 435. 
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2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
Although no statute or regulation requires that mutual funds shun 
private securities, such has been the practice. Mutual funds (particularly 
open-end funds) have not come close to the limits on illiquid assets 
suggested by the SEC.77
Table 2
 
 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why has mutual fund investment in illiquid assets been minimal? No 
doubt such investments present problems for both parties. Open-end funds, 
which must be prepared to redeem their shares, understandably seek to 
avoid a “run on the fund,” which would be exacerbated with sticky private 
assets. Further, mutual funds holding private assets may face, along with 
their investors, “valuation shock” if a financial shock ever forced the 
revaluation of private assets. The subprime re-valuations during the Panic 
of 2008 present a powerful case in point. 
Likewise, private capital is generally (and increasingly) loath to take on 
investors unwilling to abide by longer-term investment horizons. In fact, the 
typical commitment of two or more years that many private equity firms 
and hedge funds demand of their investors is at odds with the liquidity 
expectations and the turnover practices of most equity mutual funds, many 
of which turn over more than half their portfolios annually.79
Furthermore, mutual funds’ focus on public assets may simply be a 
response to customer predilections. Mutual funds are marketed (and their 
portfolios structured) with a view to public market indexes and 
 Moreover, the 
disclosure rules imposed on mutual funds concerning their portfolio 
holdings are at odds with the secrecy sought (and demanded) by private 
assets, such as private equity and hedge funds. That is, the public 
transparency required of mutual funds may be anathema to the non-
transparency of private assets. 
                                                                                                                           
 77. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, supra note 61, at 135. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 28–29 (Figure 2.9) (reporting asset-weighted turnover in stock funds of 51% in 
2007). Others have calculated a higher average turnover rate of 91%. See also John C. Bogle, 
Mutual Funds and Taxes, The Bogle eBlog (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://johncbogle.com/wordpress/2006/04/12/mutual-funds-and-taxes/. 
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comparisons, virtually ignoring the existence of private market alternatives. 
Given that mutual funds are primarily used by individual investors and not 
other institutions,80
3. Conclusion 
 it is not surprising that mutual funds would conform to 
the liquidity and price transparency demands of their principal customers. 
Institutional investors interested in private assets can access them directly. 
Almost by definition, retail investors seek the assurances of retail 
regulation. 
Without customers clamoring for private assets in their mutual fund 
portfolios, the industry has few incentives to risk adding an asset class that 
could result in redemption risks, revaluation/pricing surprises, and 
transparency conflicts. The industry, which until the fund timing scandals 
of the early 1990s was able to assert a nearly flawless record, has naturally 
avoided any risk of embarrassment. With retirement money flowing into the 
industry and without an end in sight, there is no reason for mutual funds to 
take on private investments and thus to put at risk the industry’s reputation 
for never failing to meet a redemption demand at market—at least until the 
Panic of 2008.81
B. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS 
 
Public pension funds—which invest retirement assets for government 
(mostly state) employees—are the next largest U.S. institutional investor, 
with approximately 10% of U.S. public equity and 2.4% of U.S. public 
debt.82 Public pension funds—which held, as of 2007, $4.4 trillion in assets 
(about three-fourths of the amount held by private pension funds)—have 
modestly increased their investment in private assets, but many remain 
capped by state law and general industry practices at 5% of fund assets.83
The public pension fund category is somewhat concentrated, following 
state population patterns, with the largest funds (and states) holding a 
significant portion of the category’s assets. Smaller states and their funds 
tend to follow the regulatory and investment lead of the larger states and 
funds. The largest of these funds, and the largest pension fund in the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 80. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 77, 90. 
 81. Primary Fund, one of the original and largest money market funds, “broke the buck” in 
September 2008 when it revalued its portfolio to reflect losses in its Lehman Brothers holdings. 
See Sam Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes Redemptions, 
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/money-market-fund-
breaks-buck/story.aspx?guid={56A2CEE5-5A53-4A27-A4BA-585CFBE173A4}&dist= msr_1. 
 82. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
 83. See id. at 76; see also Average Asset Mixes, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 21, 2008, 
available at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/CHART/401969275/-
1/PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY. 
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country, is the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) 
fund, with over $250 billion in assets as of 2007.84
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
 
State and local government pension funds are regulated by state law, 
which varies from state to state. Traditionally, public pension funds have 
operated under statutory “investment guidelines” that identify categories of 
eligible investments, often with percentage caps on each. The guidelines 
reflect a preference for public assets (such as federal and state obligations, 
investment-grade debt, and publicly-traded stock that meets specified 
earnings and dividend tests), which typically are subject to large caps or 
none at all. The guidelines place restrictive caps on private assets (such as 
private equity, hedge funds and private mortgages), given their greater 
illiquidity and risk.85
Over the past couple decades, the shift has been away from mandatory 
investment guidelines toward delegating greater investment discretion to 
state fund boards. For example, California gives its investment board 
“plenary authority” under a prudent investor standard to invest funds as it 
sees fit.
 
86
Public pension funds, though not subject to the redemption obligations 
of mutual funds, are generally required to invest in liquid assets so “funds 
may be readily converted into cash when needed.”
 Nonetheless, even as many state statutes have come to delegate 
investment and allocation discretion to state boards with respect to public 
assets, many continue to impose caps on specified categories of private 
assets. 
87
                                                                                                                           
 84. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 76. The federal government also 
maintains a pension plan for employees. As of 2007, federal government pension plans held only 
$1.2 trillion in assets. Approximately 12.5% of federal government employee pension fund assets 
are held in corporate equities, compared to the approximately 60% held in equities by private 
pension plans. See id. at 42, 43, 76, tbl. L 120. 
 85. For example, New York’s pension fund system is limited by statute to invest in 
conventional mortgages (up to 30%), World Bank bonds (up to 5%), Canadian government bonds 
(up to 5%), utility bonds (up to 30%), investment-grade federal, state and municipal bonds (no 
more than 2% in any one non-federal issuer), U.S. public equity (up to 70%), bank-guaranteed 
mortgages (up to 10%), bank notes (up to 5%), real estate (up to 5%), foreign public equity (up to 
10%), and “prudent” alternative companies (up to 15%). See N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW 
§ 177 (1999). 
 86. CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17 (2008) (providing that “the retirement board of a public pension 
or retirement system shall have plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of 
moneys” and “members of the [board] shall discharge their duties with respect to the system with 
the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing [of] a prudent 
person.”). 
 87. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 147-69.3(c) (2008). 
 Consistent with this 
philosophy, many states place a cap on “alternative investments”—that is, 
non-public assets such as private equity and hedge funds. For example, 
Florida and North Carolina limit investment in private firms to 5% of fund 
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assets.88 Ohio sets a target for private investments of 5%, with permissible 
ranges above and below the target.89 Texas caps hedge fund investments at 
5%.90 New York places an overall 15% limit on all alternative investments, 
subject to a prudent investor standard.91
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
 
In the past ten years, there has been a noticeable (though relatively 
small) shift in pension fund assets from public to private assets. While the 
proportion of U.S. public assets (equity and debt) has fallen from about 
75% to 65% and that of international public assets has risen from about 
15% to 20%, the proportion of private investments (such as private equity, 
hedge funds, real estate and mortgages) has risen from 10% to 15%. 
Overall, there has been a shift over the past decade through 2007 in the 
proportion of public-private assets from 90–10 to 85–15. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 88. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-44, 215-47 (2008); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 147-
69.2(b)(9) (2008) (5% cap on investments in private equity and hedge funds, defined as limited 
partner or LLC interests in firms investing in public or private equity or debt, or corporate 
buyouts). 
 89. OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES, DEFINED BENEFIT FUND 3 (Nov. 2007), https://www.opers.org/pdf/ 
investments/policies/DB-Investment-Policy.pdf#zoom=100. 
 90. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 825.3012 (2008). 
 91. N.Y. RETIRE. AND SOC. SEC. LAW § 177(8) (2008). The New York State Retirement Fund 
has 16.1% of its portfolio allocated to global equity. See infra Part IV, Exhibit 1. 
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Table 392 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breaking down the categories, the biggest shifts have been in U.S. 
public equity (falling from about 45% to 40%), U.S. public debt (falling 
from about 30% to 25%), international equity (rising from about 13% to 
20%), and private equity (rising from about 2% to 5%).93 These changes, 
however, may reflect changing values in the different asset classes, and not 
necessarily a major strategic shift in portfolio allocations. For example, the 
increase in the proportion of private assets in the Florida Retirement System 
came mostly from reported investment returns, not a re-allocation from 
public to private assets.94
                                                                                                                           
 92. Data is from PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, which each January publishes data on the largest 
public and private pension funds. The data for 2006–2007 is available in P&I 1,000: The Largest 
Retirement Plans, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 21, 2008, 
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?category=PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY&IssueD
ate=20080121. The other statistics are from the issues for Jan. 25, 1999; Jan. 22, 2001; Jan. 20, 
2003; Jan. 24, 2005; and Jan. 23, 2006. A more detailed look at the asset allocation of public 
pension funds is illustrative: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93. Hedge funds have also seen an increase in public pension fund investment over the last 
few years, although the data is somewhat less reliable because reporting funds do not always 
break out their hedge fund investments. See also Christine Williamson, Hedge Funds: Investors 
Shift to Direct Strategies, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Jan. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/PRINTSUB/823452067/-
1/PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY. 
 94. The strong performance before 2008 of private assets in public pension fund portfolios 
apparently came from private equity buyouts. See Arleen Jacobius, Private Equity: Investment 
Surge Powered by 53% Boost in Buyouts, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Jan. 21, 2008, available 
at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/PRINTSUB/930137994/-
1/PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY. A look at the Florida State Board fund reveals the impact of 
value changes as compared with new investment: 
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The allocation policies of several of the top funds, including CalPERS, 
the New York State Retirement Fund, OPERS (Ohio), the Texas Teachers 
Retirement System, and NJPERS (New Jersey) also reflect this noticeable 
shift from public to private assets.95
3. Conclusion 
 
Although the trend has been to entrust discretion to state pension boards 
to choose investment assets and determine fund allocation policies, public 
pension funds appear to continue to operate with an “eligible investment” 
mentality—as in many states they still must. The shift away from public 
assets to private assets (about 5% over the past decade through 2007)96
C. PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 
 may 
also have reached its limit. 
Private pension funds—which hold the defined-benefit retirement assets 
for private sector employees—held $5.8 trillion in assets as of 2007.97 With 
the shift by many U.S. companies from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution plans, private pension funds have declined in relative size over 
the past two decades. Once the largest institutional investor of U.S. public 
equities, private pension plan ownership has fallen from 23% in 1985 to 
13% as of 2007.98
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
 
Private pension plans are regulated by ERISA, enacted in 1974 to 
protect employees from poorly-managed and inadequately-funded pension 
plans.99
                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In response to the failure of many funds to meet mandatory funding 
levels, which has placed in jeopardy the insurance provided by the Pension 
 
 
State Board of Administration of Florida, available at http://www.sbafla.com/fund_pension.aspx. 
 95. See infra Part IV, Exhibit 1. 
 96. See Table 3, supra note 92. 
 97. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3. 
 98. See Table 1, supra note 56. 
 99. Sarah D. Burt, Pension Protection? A Comparative Analysis of Pension Reform in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 192–93 (2008). 
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Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), Congress passed the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA).100
In a defined-benefit plan, the employer bears the investment risk and 
promises the employee a defined income on retirement.
 
101 Under ERISA, 
the plan managers must invest with the care and skill of a prudent person 
acting under the same circumstances in a like position.102
The funding burden imposed by ERISA, and further increased by the 
PPA, has led many U.S. companies to abandon their defined-benefit plans. 
For example, IBM announced in 2006 it would freeze its defined-benefit 
plan in 2008, moving to a defined-contribution plan.
 The statute 
imposes no specific portfolio allocation rules. 
103 IBM joined other 
leading companies, including Verizon (the fifth largest U.S. private 
pension) and Lockheed-Martin (another top-ten plan), to announce similar 
phase-outs.104
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
 
Over the past decade, private pension plans have moved some of their 
public assets to private assets, mirroring the practice of public pension 
plans. The following chart shows the trends in portfolio allocation by 
private pension plans over the past ten years through 2007: 
 
Table 5105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The changes in asset allocations reflect a decline from about 70% to 
60% in U.S. public assets (similar to the 10% decline for public pension 
plans) and a rise from about 17% to 22% in foreign public assets (similar to 
the 5% rise for public pension plans). In the same period, private 
                                                                                                                           
 100. Id. at 207–08. Responding to the underfunding of the PBGC (currently $14 billion), the 
PPA requires companies to contribute to their pension funds up to 100 percent of current 
liabilities. See PBGC ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 8 (2008). 
 101. Burt, supra note 99, at 193–94. 
 102. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008). 
 103. Mary Williams Walsh, IBM to Freeze Pension Plans to Trim Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/06/business/06pension.html. 
 104. Id.; Jerry Geisel, Phoenix Cos. Chooses to Revamp, not Phase out, DB Plan, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS, Feb. 19, 2007, at 25, available at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20070219/PRINTSUB/702190705/1031/TOC. 
 105. See discussion, infra note 111; http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?category= 
PENSIONFUNDDIRECTORY&IssueDate=20080121. 
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investments (such as private equity, real estate, mortgages and hedge funds) 
rose moderately from about 10% to 14% (also similar to the 5% rise for 
public pension plans). Overall, the shift in the public/private allocation from 
1998 to 2007 for private pension plans went from 89–11 to 86–14—at most, 
a mild rebalancing. 
Similar patterns emerge when looking at portfolio allocations for the 
top 200 corporate pension funds—for which more accurate asset 
breakdowns are available.106 For such funds, U.S. public equities declined 
from about 45% to 35% over the decade, while U.S. public debt remained 
stable at about 25%.107 Foreign equity moved from about 15% to 20%, and 
foreign debt from 2% to 4%.108 Meanwhile, private equity increased from 
about 4% to 5% over the period, though trailed off after 2001.109 The most 
significant change was in “other investments” (including hedge funds and 
private equity not broken out separately), which moved from about 1% to 
4%.110
The story was also similar for union-sponsored pension funds. Though 
holding only 2.3% of assets among the top 200 private pension plans, union 
funds have maintained a strong position in public markets—and, 
interestingly, increased their investment in foreign public markets.
 
111
                                                                                                                           
 106. The following chart shows the asset allocation of private defined-benefit plans for the top 
200 funds by size. It was developed from statistics produced by PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS. See 
Average Asset Mixes, supra note 83; see also discussion, infra note 111. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For 
 
 
 107. See Average Asset Mixes, supra note 83. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Larger funds tend to allocate a greater proportion to private equity—but not that much 
more. A 2007 study of the twenty largest corporate pension funds found private equity investment 
to be 5.9%, compared to 5.3% for the 200 largest funds. TOM IDZOREK, IBBOTSON, PRIVATE 
EQUITY AND STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION 8 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at 
http://corporate.morningstar.com/ib/html/pdf.htm?../documents/MethodologyDocuments/ 
IBBAssociates/IbbotsonPrivateEquity.pdf. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Data, like that for other pension funds, is from PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, which each 
January publishes data on the largest public and private pension funds. The data for 2006–2007 is 
from P&I 1,000: The Largest Retirement Plans, supra note 92. The other statistics are from the 
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the top union funds, U.S. equity investment stood at 49.1% in 2007—
compared to 35.8% for all top 200 funds.112 Union funds have cut their 
bond allocations to 25.9%, while steadily increasing allocations to foreign 
equity from 4.4% in 1998 to 11.9% in 2007.113 Likewise, their position in 
private equity has risen from 0.7% in 2004 to 1.8% in 2007.114
3. Conclusion 
 
Private pension funds, following general institutional investment trends, 
have moved decidedly into foreign assets, but only slightly more into 
private assets. Under a regulatory regime that demands only that fund 
allocations be consistent with “prudent” institutional norms, it is not 
surprising that private pension plans have mimicked the investment 
strategies chosen by their public brethren. And for both, the move to private 
assets has been at best modest—and may be tapering off. 
That private pension plans have not moved aggressively into private 
asset classes is not surprising. Private pension managers, faced with the 
pressure to preserve assets and not take risks that could bankrupt the 
company, are pursuing a policy of greater (though generally cautious) 
diversification. The story of GM’s pension plan, which in 2006 increased its 
pension surplus by $9.6 billion, is illustrative.115 The favorable results 
happened not because of additional private or foreign investments, but 
rather by reducing the fund’s stock allocation from 49% to 29%, with most 
of the reallocation going to bonds.116
D. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
 In short, the incentives created by the 
PPA, which seek to have companies shore up their pension plans or bear the 
consequences, militate against seeking out higher-risk private assets. 
As of 2007, life insurance companies held about 8% of U.S. publicly-
traded equities and 20% of U.S. publicly-traded debt.117
                                                                                                                           
issues for Jan. 25, 1999; Jan. 22, 2001; Jan. 20, 2003; Jan. 24, 2005; and Jan. 23, 2006. See supra 
text accompanying note 92. 
 112. See P&I 1,000: The Largest Retirement Plans, supra note 92. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Allan Sloan, GM’s High-Performance Pension Machine, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2007, at 
D02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/ 
AR2007040901262.html. 
 116. Id. 
 117. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 42, 43, tbl. L 213. 
 Most of the equity 
held by insurance companies is held in separate accounts, as distinguished 
from the general accounts from which life insurance companies pay claims. 
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1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
State insurance law specifies asset allocation guidelines for insurers’ 
general accounts,118 though not for separate accounts whose portfolio 
allocations are largely a matter of account-specific investment policies and 
customer choice. For regulation of asset allocations in general accounts, 
many states follow the guidelines contained in the model insurance law 
adopted in 1996 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC).119 Under the Investment Company Act, which generally regulates 
separate accounts, insurance companies are typically free to choose any 
investment allocation so long as it is consistent with the name and 
marketing of the separate account.120
Illustrative of general account guidelines are those imposed by the 
states that are home to the most insurance companies.
 
121 Equity investments 
in general account “admitted assets” are subject to the following caps: 
Texas (25%), Illinois (20%) and New York (20%).122 In addition, many 
states limit the percentage of securities in any one company that an insurer 
may hold. For example, New York specifies that admitted assets invested in 
the equity holdings of any one company cannot exceed 2% of that 
company’s outstanding equity securities.123
The NAIC model insurance law, which proposes two versions of 
investment guidelines for insurers’ general accounts, tracks the approach of 
the larger states. Under the “defined standard” version, which requires 
“prudent” investment, life insurers may invest up to 20% of admitted assets 
in equities or mutual funds.
 
124 Under the “defined limits” version, equities 
cannot exceed 20%, and unlisted equities are capped at 5%.125
                                                                                                                           
 118. See generally McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701 (1945) (Congress declared that 
states regulate “the business of insurance”); see also NAIC, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION: 
HISTORY, PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE, http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_ 
brief.pdf.  
 119. See Bill Anderson, et al., State Legislative Update, NAIFA NEWIS 2 (Apr. 2003), 
http://www.advisortoday.com/archives/2003_august/Images/State_Matrix_Extended.pdf. 
 120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-1 et seq. (1940). 
 121. The three states home to the most insurance companies are Texas (141), New York (91) 
and Illinois (77). See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK 82 tbl.10.1 (2007), 
http://www.acli.com/nr/rdonlyres/a85a882f-f871-431d-976e-3316884c63eb/15016/fb_07_ 
allchapters2_w_insert.pdf. 
 122. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 425.114(b)(4)(B) (2008); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/126.10(B)(1)(a) 
(2008); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405(a)(6) (2008). 
 123. N.Y. INS. LAW §1405 (2008). 
 124. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGS. AND GUIDELINES §§ 280-1, 280-13, 280-3 (2008). 
 125. Id. 
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2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
The percentage of U.S. public equities owned by life insurance 
companies has grown slowly but steadily since 2002.126 The increase has 
coincided with the increase in separate account assets, which have grown 
from 11% of total life insurance assets in 1988,127 to 25% in 1996, to 35% 
in 2006.128
Table 6
 
The following table, drawn from data collected by the American 
Council of Life Insurers, illustrates the public/private assets breakdown 
over the eleven years preceding 2007 in insurers’ general accounts and 
separate accounts, and overall. 
 
129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The proportion of private assets (which include mortgages, real estate, 
policy loans, and other assets) has actually fallen in both the general 
accounts and the separate accounts. That is, life insurers over the past ten 
years have placed even more of their investment assets in public assets, 
whether to underwrite insurance risks (general account) or to compete with 
mutual funds and other equity tools (separate account). Looking only at 
invested assets, the overall public/private proportion has gone from 81–19 
to 87–13, and in the general accounts from 79–21 to 82–18.130 That is, both 
overall and in the regulated general accounts, life insurers have moved 
away from private assets by about 5%.131
A more complete breakdown of insurance company portfolio 
allocations reveals some growth in the allocation of general accounts to 
“other assets” such as private equity and hedge funds, but an actual decline 
 
                                                                                                                           
 126. See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK supra note 121, at 1, 9. This does not include cash 
investments and non-invested assets, which have comprised between 3.0% and 4.6% of total life 
insurance assets. 
 127. Stephen E. Roth, Susan S. Krawczyk & David S. Goldstein, Reorganizing Insurance 
Company Separate Accounts Under Federal Securities Laws, 46 BUS. LAW 537, 539 (1991). 
 128. See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 9. 
 129. Id. at 12–13. 
 130. See Table 6, supra note 129. 
 131. See id. 
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in the allocation of these alternative investments in separate accounts.132 
While “other assets” increased in the general accounts from 1.3% to 3.2%, 
they fell in the separate accounts from 8.3% to 3.0%.133
3. Conclusion 
 Overall, life 
insurance companies appear to be investing no more in private equity as of 
2006 than they did ten years ago. 
Over the past ten years, life insurance companies have increased their 
allocation to public equity, while reducing their position in private assets. In 
fact, the overall public/private proportions over the past ten years have 
increased by about 5%—bucking somewhat the slight trend of public and 
private pension plans toward more private assets. With the growth in 
separate accounts, which compete with registered mutual funds, insurance 
companies will in all likelihood continue their strong presence in public 
markets. 
The tendency of the insurance industry to stay in public markets may 
well reflect the cautious attitudes of the industry and its regulators. The 
investment limits applicable under most state insurance laws, which are 
reflected in the NAIC guidelines, carry forward the state regulatory 
tradition applicable also to state pension plans of specifying categories of 
“approved investments,” each subject to its own percentage cap. This form 
of “pigeon hole” regulation, which has been criticized for ignoring modern 
finance theory and the value of broad diversification, assumes that the 
regulated entities (whether state pension plans or insurance companies) 
need only match the investment performance of their counterparts, while 
maintaining the safety of the assets under their control.134
                                                                                                                           
 132. Portfolio allocations by life insurance companies in their general accounts and separate 
accounts has been the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See 2007 LIFE INSURERS HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 12–13. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
 134. See Lawrence J. White, The NAIC Model Investment Law: A Missed Opportunity, in THE 
STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
(E. Altman & I. Vanderhoof, eds., 1996). 
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E. BANKS (FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS) 
Compared to other institutions, financial institutions (commercial 
banks, savings associations and investment banks) held, as of 2007, a small 
percentage of public and private equities—only 1.2% of outstanding public 
equities.135 Insured banks, which are prohibited from investing in equities in 
their general portfolios, invest in equities only in their fiduciary capacity.136
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
 
Investment banks, as regulated broker-dealers, face liquidity and reserve 
requirements that prevent them from being heavily invested in equities. 
Insured banks (including national banks, state banks and state savings 
associations) are restricted from purchasing stock for their own general 
accounts, but may purchase stock for the accounts that they manage in 
trust.137
States differ as to the proper use of equities in trust investments.
 As a result, trust investment is the only way insured banks can hold 
equities, whether public or private. 
138 
However, two general rules exist. Under the New York Rule, trustees 
cannot invest in corporate stocks or bonds absent express authority in the 
trust document, state statute or court order.139 Under the Massachusetts 
Rule, trust investments are subject to a “prudent investor” standard, which 
does not bar (and may sometimes require) the trustee to invest in stocks.140
Investment banks, subject to federal securities regulation as broker-
dealers, must register with the SEC and adhere to net capital rules.
 
141 In 
1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the Glass-Steagal separation 
of commercial and investment banking and allowed for the consolidation of 
commercial banks and investment banks.142
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
 The distinctions between 
investment banks and commercial banks explain why they invest differently 
in corporate equities. 
Commercial banks invest a small percentage of their overall assets in 
corporate equities. At the close of 2007, commercial banks had less than 
0.4% of their assets in corporate equities. Savings associations invested 
                                                                                                                           
 135. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at 42, 43, 90. 
 136. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1831a(c) (2006). 
 137. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 362.3 (insured state banks); 12 C.F.R. § 
362.11 (insured state savings associations). 
 138. 76 AM. JUR. 2D TRUSTS § 460 (2008). 
 139. Mertz v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 247 N.Y. 137, 159 N.E. 888 (1928). 
 140. Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (1981). 
 141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008) (net capital rules). 
 142. Jonathan Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. 
CORP. L. 691 (2000). 
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slightly more in equities, with 1.4% of their assets in equities. Meanwhile, 
corporate equities comprised 7.3% of broker-dealer assets. 
Information on private equity assets held by banks and securities firms 
is not available. Nonetheless, data on holdings of corporate equity indicates 
increasing proportional allocations of public equity by commercial banks, 
savings banks and broker-dealers. That is, all three types of financial 
institutions have allocated more of their relatively small equity investments 
to public equity: 
 
Table 7143 
Portfolio Allocation by Banks (Financial Institutions)  
to Corporate Equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because Federal Reserve data on institutional investments labels the 
assets of securities firms as “miscellaneous,” it is difficult to determine 
whether and how securities firms have changed their investment mix over 
the past ten years. 
3. Conclusion 
Commercial banks and savings institutions, because of their liquidity 
obligations to depositors and the U.S. tradition of limiting their investment 
in equity securities, are not significant participants in equity markets. In 
contrast, securities firms (investment banks) are not as heavily regulated or 
subject to the same liquidity rules, and have more investing freedom. 
Although it is difficult to identify whether there has been a move to 
private capital by financial institutions, the effect is miniscule given the 
general inability of each to invest in equities. Nor is there any reason to 
believe, given the aftermath of the Panic of 2008 and the greater antipathy 
to risk-taking by U.S. financial institutions, that there will be a movement 
toward private equity. At least during the overhang of the subprime debt 
                                                                                                                           
 143. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 3, at tbl. T.109, 73 tbl. T.114, 81 tbl. T.129. 
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crisis, it seems unlikely that financial institutions will be moving strongly 
into another illiquid asset class. 
F. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 
Foreign private investors and foreign sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
represent the fastest-growing category of investors in the U.S. public equity 
markets. As of 2007, foreign wealth owned more than 13% of U.S. public 
equities, surpassing private pension funds to become the second largest 
institutional investor in U.S. public equities (behind only mutual funds).144 
From 2001 to 2007, foreign wealth (government funds, institutional 
investors and foreign individuals) invested in U.S. equities doubled from 
$1.4 trillion to $2.8 trillion.145
Although SWFs have received a good deal of attention, most foreign 
investment in the United States has been non-governmental, accounting for 
nearly three-fourths of investment flows into the United States.
 
146 
Nonetheless, as proceeds from commodity exports and balance-of-payment 
surpluses continue to flow into foreign government coffers, there is a 
general consensus that SWFs will play an increasingly larger role.147 For 
example, the IMF projected (before the global economic slowdown of 
2008) that global SWF assets, which stood at about $2.5 trillion as of mid-
2008, could reach $12 trillion by 2012.148
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
 
SWFs are generally non-transparent and so too are their investment 
policies. Foreign institutional investors are subject to national investment 
rules on portfolio allocation, which typically require that non-national 
investments be limited to publicly-traded securities—much as for U.S. 
institutional investors that invest outside the United States. 
Foreign companies, which have seized upon the decline in the dollar to 
make business investments and acquisitions in the United States, are a 
                                                                                                                           
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Peter S. Goodman & Lousie Story, Overseas Investors Buying U.S. Holdings at 
Record Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/business/20invest.html?ex=1358571600&en=34079637cb59
bb3a&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink; see also Brad Setser, Follow the Money, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Sept. 23, 2008, http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/category/sovereign-
wealth-funds/. 
 147. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets; Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
the World Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 119–21 (2008). Funding for SWFs comes from two 
sources: (1) commodity exports, especially petroleum, either owned or taxed by the government, 
and (2) balance-of-payment surpluses. The first SWF, the Kuwait Investment Board created in 
1953 by Kuwait to invest surplus oil revenue, stood virtually alone for many years. But since 
2005, twelve new SWFs have been created. 
 148. See Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 179, 189 (2008). 
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significant source of capital for U.S. private companies.149 Like U.S. 
multinationals, foreign companies (in Europe and Japan, for example) do 
not operate under constraints when expanding their businesses. In fact, the 
significant disclosure obligations under the U.S. securities laws (such as the 
5% reporting threshold and the 10% short-swing profit rules under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934)150
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
 encourage foreign companies to 
acquire full 100% ownership rather than partial ownership. 
Anecdotal information about SWFs is easy to find, but reliable data is 
much more difficult. Few funds disclose financial information or 
investment policies. Nonetheless, the consensus estimate is that SWF assets 
worldwide total about $2.5 trillion.151
SWFs are a heterogeneous group of investors that apply a wide range of 
investment strategies reflecting their different objectives. When executing 
their strategic asset allocation (SAA), some SWFs invest solely in 
publicly-listed financial assets (e.g., bonds and equities), while others 
invest across all major asset classes, including alternative investments. 
Some SWFs invest relative to market indices and sometimes put additional 
caps on the maximum holding of each company’s shares with a view to 
ensuring diversification. Other SWFs that aim at maximizing absolute 
returns over longer time horizons may shift between different asset classes 
and acquire larger stakes in specific companies that they see as profitable 
investments. It is unclear how active a role they have in these companies. 
However, the evidence suggests that SWF are generally passive and long-
term investors with no desire to impact company decisions by actively 
using their voting rights. Some apply social responsibility or ethical 
guidelines to rule out specific industries (e.g., tobacco, military) that may 
not conform with the social and ethical objectives of their governments.
 
Lack of transparency makes it difficult to determine how SWFs are 
invested. Norway’s Government Pension Fund (the second largest SWF) 
has been held out as a model for its transparency, but few other SWFs, 
especially those of the Gulf states, have followed Norway’s lead. A report 
by the IMF summarizes SWF investment strategies: 
152
                                                                                                                           
 149. Goodman & Story, supra note 146, at A1. 
 150. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2009). 
 151. Estimates of worldwide SWF assets range from $1.9 trillion to $3.3 trillion. See Lyons, 
supra note 148, at 189 (The IMF estimates between $1.9 and $2.9 trillion); see also Fed. Reserve 
Bd. of San Francisco Economic Letter, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stumbling Blocks or Stepping 
Stones to Financial Globalization? (Dec. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2007/el2007-38.html (estimating SWF assets 
between $1.5 and $2.5 trillion); Veljko Fotak, Bernardo Bortolotti & William Megginson, The 
Financial Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in Listed Companies (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108585 (estimating value at $3.3 trillion). 
 152. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS – A WORK AGENDA 
(2008), available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf. 
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Virtually absent from the scant information on foreign investment 
practices is any indication of a shift toward private assets. For example, 
estimates of portfolio holdings in SWFs of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries as of 2007 were $300 billion in U.S. equities, $360 billion in 
bonds and deposits, and $130 billion in alternatives.153 Specifically, 
allocations for the Abu Dhabi fund in U.S. dollar assets have been 
estimated at 70–85% in public equity and fixed income and 15–28% in 
private assets, including private equity, real estate, and alternatives.154
3. Conclusion 
 
Foreign investors—both private and sovereign—may be the wild card 
in the public-private capital pendulum. Although private foreign institutions 
(banks and mutual funds) have regulatory limits that compel investment in 
public markets, SWFs face the curious problem of having capital that may 
be unsuited for private companies. With the expectation that private equity 
investors bring management expertise to the enterprise, SWFs have yet to 
prove their suitability. 
G. ENDOWMENT FUNDS 
In 2005, endowment funds invested by charitable foundations and 
educational institutions held $1.3 trillion in assets.155 Endowments, which 
are typically subject to little regulation beyond their institution-specific 
restrictions, invest in a wide array of assets and thus offer a textbook 
experiment in balancing risk and return.156 More than any other category of 
institutional investor, endowments have moved into private capital markets, 
though with a continuing and steady presence in public markets.157
1. Portfolio Allocation Rules 
 
Endowments are unique among institutional investors because of their 
unusual combination of characteristics: defined spending rules (similar to 
pension funds), tax exemption (similar to public pension funds), absence of 
a safety net (unlike private pension plans), and aim to preserve capital 
indefinitely (unlike any other institution). Given their relatively unrestricted 
ability to pursue investment strategies and allocations, endowments reveal 
                                                                                                                           
 153. Brad Setser & Rachel Ziemba, Understanding the New Financial Superpower: The 
Management of GCC Official Foreign Assets 14 (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SetserZiemba GCCfinal.pdf. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Keith Brown, Lorenzo Garlappi & Cristian Tiu, The Troves of Academe: Asset Allocation, 
Risk Budgeting and the Investment Performance of University Endowment Funds, at 1, Aug. 2007, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981436. 
 156. Id. at 2. 
 157. See generally FRONTIER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INVESTING LIKE HARVARD AND YALE 
ENDOWMENT FUNDS (2007), http://www.seasholes.com/files/Frontier_-_Investing_like_Harvard 
_and_Yale.pdf. 
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the pressures to re-allocate portfolios to private assets, in search of higher 
returns.158
University endowments (for which detailed information is available) 
are typically managed with a combination of both passive and active 
strategies. University boards, for example, will often set allocation targets 
for outside money managers.
 
159 The money managers (such as the Harvard 
Management Company) then invest in various asset classes according to the 
allocation targets set by the university board.160 Whether managed passively 
or actively, most endowment assets are managed by outside managers, who 
play an important role in asset allocation.161
2. Portfolio Allocation in Practice 
 
The annual survey of university endowments, conducted by the 
National Association of College and University Business Officers, reveals 
that university endowments have moved decidedly from public to private 
assets.162
                                                                                                                           
 158. Brown, Garlappi & Tiu, supra note 155, at 1–2. 
 159. Id. at 5–6. 
 160. Id. at 5. 
 161. Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar & Jialan Wang, Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of 
University Endowment Success 4 (MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4698-08, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027450. 
 162. Brown, Garlappi & Tiu, supra note 155, at 39. 
 Allocation of private assets—which includes real estate, hedge 
funds, venture capital, private equity and natural resources—has increased 
from 3.3% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2007, with the ratio of public/private 
investments changing from 96–4 to 79–21 over the same period: 
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Table 8163 
Endowment Funds (by allocation of investment funds) 
 
 
 
 
 
The move to private assets from 1990 to 2007 has come at the expense 
of cash positions, which fell in the period from 10.3% to 3.5%, and 
publicly-traded fixed income investments, which fell from 35.6% to 
18.6%.164 Of the private assets, hedge fund investments have had the largest 
growth, increasing from 0.3% to 10.6% of endowment assets.165 Private 
equity increased more modestly from 0.2% to 2.3% of university 
endowment assets.166
Endowment size has affected portfolio allocation, with larger university 
endowments allocating their portfolios to a wider array of asset classes and 
thus earning significantly higher returns.
 
167
                                                                                                                           
 163. Id. A more complete breakdown including the specific classes of private assets, shows the 
rise of investments in hedge funds and private equity: 
 
 Investments in hedge funds and 
private equity, which now constitute 12.9% of endowment assets, have been 
Endowment Funds 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Public equity 49.8% 54.8% 62.3% 58.4% 57.6% 
Fixed income 35.6% 30.0% 23.4% 21.4% 18.6% 
Real estate 2.9% 2.1% 1.9% 3.2% 3.5% 
Cash 10.3% 6.5% 4.0% 3.4% 3.5% 
Hedge funds 0.3% 1.6% 0.7% 8.9% 10.6% 
Venture capital 0.6% 0.7% 2.4% 0.8% 0.9% 
Private equity 0.2% 0.2% 1.0% 1.6% 2.3% 
Natural resources 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 1.0% 1.6% 
Other 0.0% 3.9% 4.0% 1.4% 1.4% 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Lerner, Schoar & Wang, supra note 161. For example, Yale University’s endowment has 
come to hold less of its portfolio in public equities (28% percent in 2007), while increasing its 
allocation to private equity. YALE UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS OFFICE, THE YALE ENDOWMENT 
11 (2007), available at http://www.yale.edu/investments/Yale_Endowment_07.pdf. Wake Forest’s 
endowment, much smaller than that of Yale’s (though often regarded as a model for smaller 
endowments), held 38% of its portfolio in public equities, reflecting the phenomenon that 
investment in public equities is inversely proportional to endowment size. WAKE FOREST 
UNIVERSITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–7, at 22 T.6 (2007), available at 
http://www.wfu.edu/fas/reports/06-07finreport.pdf. See also Rebecca Buckman, Venture Firms vs. 
Investors: Yale and the Like Quietly Cite Pressure to Back Offbeat Funds, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 
2007, at C1. 
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concentrated in larger endowments, which have the connections, the asset 
base and the investment time horizon to make large, longer-term 
commitments.168 Larger endowment funds, in main part because of their 
higher returns, have grown dramatically over the last fifteen years.169
Despite the move to private assets, university endowments remain 
firmly rooted in public equity, which actually increased proportionally in 
their portfolios from 49.8% in 1990 to 57.6% in 2007—reflecting in part 
the strong equity returns of the 1990s.
 This 
has been widely attributed to the use of private assets by endowments, 
which, as 2008 has shown, may not have been worth the risk. 
170 Public equity, following the trend 
of other institutional investors, has become more international. U.S. public 
equity investments have declined since 1990, while foreign public equity 
investments have increased significantly—from 2.3% in 1990 to 12.7% in 
2005.171
3. Conclusion 
 
University endowment funds, unfettered by portfolio allocation 
standards and more inclined to seek to balance risk and return in a 
diversified portfolio, have moved more aggressively toward private assets 
than any of the U.S. institutional investors. Nonetheless, the move has not 
come at the expense of public equity, as the usual “going private” story 
tells, but rather at the expense of cash positions and public debt. Moreover, 
there are indications that the strong move to private assets may have 
reached a natural limit.172
                                                                                                                           
 168. See Lerner, Schoar & Wang, supra note 161, at 4. 
 169. Id. at 3. For example, in 2005, the endowments of the Ivy Plus schools (Ivy League, Duke, 
Stanford, CalTech, and MIT) earned 14%, as compared to 9% for other schools. 
 170. See National Association of College and University Business Officers, Average Asset 
Class Allocation of Total Assets (2008), available at http://www.nacubo.org/documents/ 
research/Average%20Asset%20Allocation%20of%20Total%20Assets_2007%20NES.pdf. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Harvard, after losing 22% in the first four months of fiscal 2008, estimated total losses for 
the year at 30% reflecting revaluation of real estate holdings and private assets. John Hechinger 
and Craig Karmin, Harvard Hit by Loss as Crisis Spreads to Colleges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, 
at A1. 
 
Overall, investment by endowments reflects a propensity to stay in the 
public markets, even as some endowments have increased their allocation to 
private markets. Small endowments need public markets because they are 
not ready to be players in private equity and hedge funds. And the larger 
endowments, after moving aggressively into private assets, seem to be 
tapering off—the more recent increases in private assets a result of their 
stronger returns and not increased allocation. The current decline in the 
returns on hedge fund investments portends an allocation to private assets 
of no more than 20% going forward—hardly an abandonment of public 
assets. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: STAYING PUBLIC 
Institutional investors, far from being a free radical capable of 
rebalancing their portfolios at will, are legally and culturally captives of 
public markets. There is little reason to believe this will change, unless 
public assets somehow are shown to be clearly inferior (over a significant 
time period) compared to private assets. At most, private capital markets 
have over the past several years been exploring their boundaries—as they 
do with some regularity. There is little reason to think they will swallow or 
even come close to challenging the dominance of public markets. 
Certainly, the evidence of the past ten years indicates there has been no 
institutional tidal shift toward private assets. While some institutional 
investors have allocated more of their portfolios to private assets (public 
pension funds, endowments, and perhaps foreign institutions), others have 
allocated less of their portfolios (private pension funds, insurance 
companies, and perhaps financial institutions). And the largest institutional 
category (mutual funds) has not wavered in its nearly complete allocation to 
public assets. 
On one hand, it might be argued that the failure of institutional 
investors to move more strongly into private assets is simply (and 
regrettably) a matter of regulatory constraint. Arguments have been made 
that some institutional investors, such as insurance companies, are stodgy 
captives of a “permitted investments” mentality that deprives their 
beneficiaries of the safer, stronger returns that diversification through 
private assets brings to an investment portfolio. But even as SWFs and 
endowments, unconstrained by regulation and adherents to modern 
portfolio theory, have moved into private assets, their move has been tepid. 
Public assets, particularly public equity, appear to remain the bulwark in 
their diversified portfolios. 
Moreover, even if the regulatory constraints on institutional asset 
allocation were broadly lifted, it is unclear whether the supply side of the 
capital markets would rush toward private assets. Already many 
institutional investors have the regulatory freedom to move toward private 
assets, but have not. Mutual funds, perhaps because of liquidity concerns 
and perhaps because of customer demand, have remained bound to public 
assets, despite SEC policy that permits them to invest significantly more in 
private assets. And other institutional investors that are subject to 
“permitted investment” regulation have not tested the allocation caps for 
private assets. 
In the end, given the current shakeout in the credit markets—which has 
dramatically exposed the risks of investing in non-transparent private 
assets—it is unclear that private markets offer significantly different risk-
return opportunities compared to those available in public markets. In fact, 
many companies that have “gone private” by moving from public equity to 
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private equity have remained in the public debt markets because of 
institutional investor demand. 
Institutional investors (the supply side of the U.S. capital markets) have 
exhibited a strong preference for investments in public companies—and the 
market and regulatory protections such investments imply. From 
appearances, public markets are here to stay. 
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Exhibit 1 
Asset Allocations of Notable Public Pension Funds 
 
CalPERS173
Domestic Equity 
 
40.0% 
Domestic Fixed Income 22.3% 
International Equity 19.5% 
International Fixed Income 2.3% 
Cash 1.4% 
Alternative Investment/Private Equity 6.7% 
Real Estate 8.0% 
  
New York State Retirement174
Domestic Equity (Publicly Traded) 
 
42.2% 
Private Equity 6.5% 
Absolute Return 3.0% 
Real Estate 4.4% 
Global Equity 16.1% 
Bonds, Cash, Mortgages 20.9% 
Inflation Indexed Bonds 6.9% 
  
Ohio Public Employee Retirement System175
Domestic Equity 
 
43.8% 
Real Estate 4.7% 
Private Equity 1.7% 
International Equity 20.3% 
U.S. Fixed Income 25.7% 
International Fixed Income 2.0% 
Cash Equivalents 1.8% 
  
                                                                                                                           
 173. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT: 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2007 (2007), at 16, available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/investmentreport-2007/. 
 174. N.Y. STATE AND LOCAL RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT: FOR FISCAL 
YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 2007 (2007), at 62, available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/ 
word_and_pdf_documents/publications/cafr/cafr_07.pdf. 
 175. OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEES RET. SYS., THE COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT: FOR THE 
YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2006 AND 2005 (2007), at 68, available at 
https://www.opers.org/pubs-archive/investments/cafr/2007-cafr-hires.pdf#zoom=80.  
288 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
North Carolina Retirement System176
Fixed Income 
 
35.5% 
Domestic Equity 40.0% 
International Equity 17.0% 
Real Estate 4.5% 
Alternatives 2.9% 
  
New York City Employee Retirement System177
Domestic Equity 
 
46.8% 
Domestic Fixed Income 30.3% 
International Equity 18.6% 
Alternative Investments 4.3% 
  
New Jersey PERS178
Domestic Equities 
 
41.7% 
Domestic Fixed Income 26.1% 
International Equities 22.8% 
International Fixed Income 1.3% 
Commodity Linked Notes 0.7% 
Police and Fireman's Mortgages 1.6% 
Private Equity 1.5% 
Real Estate 1.3% 
Absolute Return Strategy Funds 3.1% 
 
                                                                                                                           
 176. N.C. DEP’T OF THE STATE TREASURER, THE STATE TREASURER’S ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE PEOPLE OF N.C. (2007), at 27, available at http://www.nctreasurer.com/NR/rdonlyres/ 
BCF46334-5821-4819-B2AF9DC2E29FB3EF/0/NCREPORTweb.pdf.  
 177. N.Y. CITY EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS. & N.Y. CITY PUB. EMPLOYEES’ GROUP LIFE INS. 
PLAN, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FIN. REPORT (2007), at 99, available at 
http://www.nycers.org/Pdf/cafr/2007/NYCERS_Final.pdf.  
 178. STATE OF N.J., PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS.: FIN. STATEMENTS AND SCHEDULES (2007), 
at 15, available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/2007_cafr_audit_report.pdf. 
